Territorial Dynamics in Chiloé

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
Rimisp – Latin American Center for rural Development



Background










The area of study



- Castro, Dalcahue, Chonchi, Curaco de Vélez, Quinchao, Puqueldón.
- •Territory articulated around the city of Castro
- •From traditional agriculture and fishing and tourism to the salmon industry





Conceptual framework





Figure 1. A framework for the analysis of rural territorial dynamics (the section on natural capital is taken from Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).



Evolution of the industry






The institucional change

- Property rights without limit of time over concession
- Concessions can be sold/bought in the market
- Processing (cambiar no sé la palabra exacta) in order to obtain property right is costly and difficult
- Environmental management based on selfregulation systems



Industry concentration





Effects on the territory

- Social changes (Income, population, poverty, employment)
- Environmental changes
- Cultural changes



Some economics changes

	Year 2003			Year 2006			
	Total Chile	Communes with salmons	Communes without salmons	Total Chile	Communes with salmons	Communes without salmons	
Poverty (%)	19	17	25.1	13.7	9.9	19.6	
Indigence (%)	5	3	6	3.2	2.6	4.3	
Income (\$ de nov 2006)	579,919	478,135	419,591	613,206	560,244	452,012	
Education	10.2	8.9	9	10.1	9	9.1	
Analphabetism	4	5.7	5.3	3	4.1	4.6	



Environmental effects

- Pollution in marine ecosystems due to salmon feeding practices (Buschmann, A. y Fortt, A. 2005)
- Pollution in marine ecosystems due to applications of chemical (Chile apply 75 times more antibiotics by than Norway) (Cabello, F. 2003)
- Impacts on native ocean fauna due to the escape of salmons (Pizarro, R. y Furci, G. 2006)
- Beach pollution with industrial residues
- Proliferation of salmon diseases (ISA) due to poor sanitary management and weak control systems



Community perceptions on the salmon industry contribution

		¿Are you agree?			
		Yes	No	WO	Total
Your perception that community think about salmon industries	High Beneficial	67	5	0	72
	Beneficial	13	2	0	15
	Neutral	4	1	0	5
	Negative	2	0	0	2
	High negative	2	0	2	4
	Without opinion	0	0	2	2
		0	0	0	0
		87	8	5	100



The survey

Data:

- Stratified Multi-stage sample design
- Territorial representative sample
- 856 surveyed households
- Retrospective questions to address demographic, labor and assets changes
- Current income module (multiple income sources)



Group incomes

Livelihood strategies	Mean autonomous	Freq. 1990 (%)	Freq. 2009 (%)
	income (year 2009)		
Pure ag (1)	72,052	27.2	16.3
Mixed ag (2)	183,056 a	4.4	5.7
Pure acq/fish (3)	90,468 a b	13.3	19.9
Mixed acq/fish (4)	167,175 a b c	3.2	7.8
Sec-tertiary (5)	149,137 a b c d	22.9	33.7
Other (6)	113,593 a b c d e	28.9	16.7

⁽a) Statistically dif. from (1). (b) Statistically dif. from (2). (c) Statistically dif. from (3). (d) Statistically dif. from (4).



⁽e) Statistically dif. from (5). Individual confidence level: 5% (t method) Welch standard errors, Satterthwaite approximate degrees of freedom.

Transition matrix

2008	Pure ag (1)	Mixed ag (2)	Pure	Mixed	Sec-tertiary	Other (6)
1990			acq/fish (3)	acq/fish (4)	(5)	
Pure ag (1)	0.381	0.104	0.158	0.005	0.094	0.257
Mixed ag (2)	0.242	0.303	0.182	0.030	0.152	0.091
Pure	0.081	0.030	0.434	0.162	0.192	0.101
acq/fish (3)						
Mixed	0.000	0.000	0.167	0.333	0.458	0.042
acq/fish (4)						
Sec-tertiary	0.029	0.035	0.059	0.065	0.700	0.118
(5)						
Other (6)	0.107	0.009	0.251	0.098	0.358	0.177





Factors affecting changes in Livelihood strategies (Order probit estimates, outcome = shift to a higher/lower income strategy, up to 5 (-5) clases


	Spec. 1	Spec. 2
HH size	0.053**	0.057**
Access to institutions	0.204*	0.215**
Access to land	-0.158*	-0.185**
Members below 15 years old	0.016	0.011
Members above 64 years old	-0.085*	-0.102**
participation in social organizations	0.104	0.113
HH head with knowledge of traditional legends	-0.130	-0.101
Averga years of shooling (members above 14 years old)	0.001	0.053**
Female HH head	0.008	0.004
Indigenous HH head	-0.066	-0.364**
HH with radio	-0.001	0.034
Same HH head	0.252***	0.620***
Same HH headXschooling		-0.094***
Same HH head X indigenous HH head		0.487**
N	739	739
pseudo R2	0.013	0.021
Wald x2 (p-val)	0.000	0.000





Marginal effects













Conclusions

- ☐ Institutional change was a key factor permitting development of salmon industry in Chiloé (maybe as important as natural conditions)
- Institutional change the way that marine space is administered, excluding local population of decision making
- ☐ Institutional change without adequate environmental control (self regulation) also imply very negative impact over natural recourses, but...
- Allowed the growth of a major industry that change territorial economy providing incentives to households to modify their livelihood strategies, but
- Not all household seem equally propensity to shift their LS (for example Ag based HH seem less propensity to adapt, at least compared with aquic. Based HH)
- Shift to higher income strategies seems associated to some assets (labor supply (+), land (-), access to institutions (+), education (+), ethnic (-).

